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NOTES
clearly within the no-strike clause. The presumption of legality re-
quirement is wholly appropriate in order to protect legal strikes from
injunctions since the burden of clear draftsmanship should Fall on the
employer given the absolute provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Similarly, although only a preponderance standard is necessary in
suits filed under section 301,"" the: requirement that the employer
prove illegality by convincing evidence also seems appropriate given
the possibility of ambiguous no-strike clauses."'
If conscientiously applied by the district courts, these stringent
safeguards should represent a significant obstacle to an employer
seeking to obtain injunctive relief in a sympathy strike situation. Ac-
cordingly, the proposed accommodation, buttressed by these
safeguards, could both provide an employer with the Opportunity to
guard against sympathy strikes by unambiguously making that inten-
tion manifest in the collective bargaining agreement, and could pro-
tect legitimate union activity from injunctions.
CONCLUSION
While the refusal to accommodate in the Buffalo Forge decision
can be analyzed as consistent with the landmark accommodation in
Boys Markets, l rrc. v. Retail Clerks Union, it remains possible to justify an
independent accommodation in a sympathy Strike situation. It has
been noted that if' the process of accommodation is "broadly" con-
ceived as a means of reconciling apparently inconsistent statutory
aims, rather than "narrowly" relegated to reconciling the Norris-
LaGuardia Act to the congressional preference for arbitration, then
an accommodation in a sympathy strike situation can. be reached
which would support a panoply of congressional objectives while still
retaining the core purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
KENNETH .). MALLOY
Constitutional Law—Due Process—the Interests in Reputation and
Employment—Paul v. Davis' and Bishop v. Wood 2 —In two recent
cases, the Supreme Court has had occasion to reconsider the extent to
1 " See, e.g., Bartels v. Lithographers' 	 Photo-Engravers' Union No.. One-P, 306
F. Supp. 1266, 1272, 73 L.R.R.M. 2154, 2158 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd per curiae 431 F.2d
1205, 75 L.R.R.M. 2400 (2d Cir. 1970).
141 There is some support for a higher standard of proof in § 6 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act since it requires "clear proof' of participation or ratification of unlawful
acts before a member of a union can be held liable, See, e.g., Ramsey v. United Mine
Workers, 401 U.S. 302, 307.10 (1971).
1 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
2 426 U,S. 341 (1976), Both cases are noted in The Supreme Court, 1975 Tenet, 90
HAIM L. Rev 56, 86-104 (1976).
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which the due process clause protects interests in reputation and in
public employment. Paul v. Davis, decided in March of 1976, involved
a claim of state impairment of an individual's interest in reputation.
Interests in both reputation and employment were involved in Bishop
v. Wood, decided last June. Due process safeguards were denied in
both cases, in opinions which, in this note's analysis, represent a nar-
rowing of the protection previously afforded these interests.
The reputation claim advanced in Paul v. Davis. arose when the
respondent, Davis, was identified as an "active shoplifter" by name
and photograph in a flyer distributed to shopkeepers in Louisville,
Kentucky, by the petitioners, who were chiefs of police in Louisville
and Jefferson County. 3
 Although Davis had been arrested once for
shoplifting, no determination of guilt had been made when the flyers
were distributed. 4
 Davis brought suit under section 1983 of Title 42
of the United States Code, 3 claiming a violation of his constitutional
rights without due process of law.° The United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky dismissed the claim, finding that
no constitutional right was infringed.' The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. 8
On writ of certiorari," the Supreme Court, in a five to three
decision,'° reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and HELD
that reputation, in order to be protected by the due process clause,
must either be connected with "some more tangible interest"" or be
"recognized and protected" by state law.' 2 The Court's first holding
rested on an analysis of prior decisions which revealed, in the
3
 424 U.S. at 694-95.
Id. at 696. The charge against Davis was later dismissed. Id.
6
 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
424 U.S. at 696. Davis relied on the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution: "nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST, amend, XIV
1.
424 U.S. at 696.
Davis v. Paul, 505 F.2d 1180, 1184 (6th Cir. 1974).
" 421 U.S. 909 (1975).
" Justice Stevens did not participate. 424 U.S. at 714.
" 424 U.S. at 701; see id. at 701-10.
' 2 Id. at 710; we id. at 711-12. The Supreme Court also held that respondent had
not suffered an invasion of a constitutionally protected right of privacy. While "zones of
privacy" created by specific constitutional guarantees qualify for protection,
respondent's claim did not fall within these areas. Constitutional support of privacy ex-
tends to matters relating to family, procreation, child rearing, education, and the like.
Arrest records are not of this order and fie beyond the pale of protection. Id. at 713.
The Court also rejected the notion that the due process clause, in combination
with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), makes actionable under federal law all torts committed by
state officials. Id. at 698-700. •
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majority's view, that the reputation interest had heretofore been ac-
corded constitutional protection only in conjunction with government
invasion of some other, more "tangible" interest such as
employment." The second holding derived from the Court's observa-
tion that a variety of interests have over the years merited the protec-
tion of the due process clause by virtue of the recognition and protec-
tion initially afforded them by state law." The Court noted that. the
law in Kentucky confers no guarantee of continued enjoyment of
reputation.' 5
 Accordingly, as the respondent here was asserting an
impairment of reputation alone, unconnected with any tangible in-
terest, and unprotected by state law, due process was not required."t
An opportunity was soon presented to the Court to apply its
holding in Davis that injury to reputation is constitutionally cognizable
when connected with deprivation of a "tangible" interest. Bishop v.
Wood" involved a claim of state impairment of two constitutionally
protected interests: a property interest in employment and a liberty
interest in reputation." Petitioner Bishop was dismissed for alleged
misconduct from his position as a police officer in the city of Marion,
North Carolina," Contending that the reasons for his discharge were
false, Bishop maintained that he was entitled to a pretermination
hearing.'" He brought suit under section 1983 of Title 42 of the
United States Code 2 ' against the city manager and the chief of police.
Bishop claimed a property interest in employment on two grounds."
'A 424 U.S. at 701.
17 1(1. at 711. The Court cites, for instance, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971),
which required clue process prior to revocation of a driver's license and vehicle registra-
tion. hi. at 542-43. This holding that constitutional significance attaches to reputation
which has been legally guaranteed by the state suggests a property interest under the
definition in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). which requires "a
legitimate claim of' entitlement." The entitlements doctrine has been applied to interests
which were initially conferred by the state. E,g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S„ 254, 262
(1970) (welfare benefits); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972) (public
employment); Coss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 5115, 573 (1975) (public education). Reputation
would seem to differ from such entitlements in that it is not initially conferred by the
state but is acqMred and maintained solely by the individual's own effort. This casenote
does not further examine the Court's conditioning of constitutional protection of repu-
tation upon recognition by state law. For a fuller treatment of this aspect of the Davit
opinion, see The Supreme Court, 1975 Ter111 , 90 14Aay. L.' REV. 56, 86-104 (1976).
'A 424 U.S. at 711.
"Id. at 712. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White dissented. Justice Brennan,
writing for the dissenters, insisted that "[On• precedents clearly mandate that a person's
interest in his good name and reputation is cognizable as a 'liberty' interest within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause, and the Omnt has simply failed to distinguish
those precedents in any rational manner in holding that no invasion of a 'liberty' in-
terest was effected in the official stigmatizing of respondent as a criminal without any
'process' whatsoever." Id. at 734.
17 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
'" Id. at 343.
'"Id. at 342.
2" Id. at 343.
21
 For the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), see note 5 supra.
22 426 U.S. at 344.
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First, a city ordinance" prescribing certain grounds for dismissal of
permanent employees was asserted as conferring tenure." Second,
various circumstances of Bishop's employment—his period of service,
his designation as a "permanent" as opposed to "probationary" em-
ployee, and the infrequency of discharge in the department—were
cited as inducements of a valid expectation of continued
employment." Bishop claimed that this legitimate expectation consti-
tuted a property interest cognizable under the due process clause, and
that state deprivation of that property interest could not constitution-
ally be accomplished without due process of law." In addition, Bishop
contended that the false charges of misconduct 27 impaired his reputa-
tion and thereby infringed his interest in liberty, also protected by the
due process clause." The United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina granted summary judgment for the defen-
dants, finding no infringement of a constitutional right in the
dismissal." The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed." -
On writ of certiorari, 3 ' the Supreme Court, in a five to four de-
23 Article II, 11 6, of the Personnel Ordinance of the City of Marion, N.C., pro-
vided:
Dismissal. A permanent employee whose work is not satisfactory over a
period of time shall be notified in what way his work is deficient and what
he must do if his work is to be satisfactory. If a permanent employee 1161s
to perform work up to the standard of the classification held, or continues
to be negligent, inefficient, or unfit to perform his duties, he may be dis-
missed by the City Manager. Any discharged employee shall be given writ-
ten notice of his discharge setting forth the effective date and reasons for
his discharge if he shall request such a notice.
The ordinance is quoted at 326 U.S. at 344 n.5.
" 326 U.S. at 344. The principle that a property interest in public employment
may be created by statute was established in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577-78 (1972). In Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), six Justices agreed that a sta-
tute creates such a property interest when it conditions discharge upon cause. See note
190 infra.
"See 326 U.S. at 344; id. at 354 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Board of Re-
gents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), the Court had expressed the view that a pur-
pose of the institution of property is to protect the legitimate claims of entitlement
upon which people rely. In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972), the Court
concluded that a legitimate claim of entitlement to public employment may arise from
the facts and circumstances surrounding that employment.
26 See 426 U.S. at 343-44.
" 426 U.S. at 343. The Court accepted Bishop's version of the facts because the
district court granted summary judgment against him, and in so doing was required to
resolve all material facts in his Favor. Id. at 347 & n.11.
20 1d. at 343. The Court in Wisconsin v, Constantineau, 417 U.S. 433, 437 (1971),
had held that "where a person's good name [or] reputation .. • is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essen-
tial." The Court in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576, 574-75, (1975), found that due
process requirements apply to state deprivation of "the liberty interest in reputation."
29 377 F. Supp. 501, 505 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
3° 498 F.2d 1341, 1341 (4th Cir. 1974). After granting a rehearing en bane, this
decision was affirmed without opinion by an equally divided court. 426 U.S. at 343 n.3.
21
 423 U.S. 890 (1975).
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cision, affirmed the court of appeals, and HELD first, that under a
"tenable" interpretation of state law proffered by the lower federal
courts, and accepted by the Supreme Court, Bishop did not have a
protected property interest in his employment;a 2 and second, that in
cases of impairment of reputation accompanied by deprivation of
another, tangible, interest,"" due process intervenes only where there
has been prior public disclosure of the defamatory statements."
Deference to the district court's "tenable"" interpretation of the
ordinance governing discharge, an interpretation which received the
affirmance of an equally divided court of appeals, was considered ap-
propriate because the federal judge sitting in North Carolina had ac-
quired expertise in North Carolina law. 3'i The Court dismissed
Bishop's claim that a property interest was implied in the circum-
stances of his employment by noting that such claims must be based
on state law, 37 and North Carolina law provided that a protected in-
terest in employment must derive from a statutory or contractual
guarantee." The Court proceeded to examine and reject Bishop's
claim relating to the ordinance, with no further discussion of a possi-
ble contract guarantee. Bishop, in Fact, did not have a written
contract. 39 Yet, the Court disregarded the possibility of a contract im-
plied in the state's non-statutory conduct relating to public employ-
ment.
Thus disposing of Bishop's employment claim, the Court turned
to the assertion that the injury to reputation demanded due process.
Without alluding to the Paul v. Davis denial of constitutional stature to
reputation alone," and also without explicitly defining the "tangibil-
ity" of the accompanying employment interest in Bishop, the Court
proceeded to examine the merits of the reputation claim.'[ The Court
disallowed this claim, not on the ground that the interest in reputa-
tion which plaintiff asserted was not constitutionally cognizable, but
because the reasons for discharge were not made public before this
'° 426 U.S. at 345-47.
33 Sre id. at 348 n. 12. Under Paul v. Davis this combination renders the reputa-
tion interest constitutionally significant. See Davis, 424 U.S. at 701-10. See text at note
I 3 supra.
34
 426 U.S. at 348; see id. to 348-49.
as
	
at 347.
"Id. at 345. The Court noted that the district court's decision was affirmed by
the court of appeals and expressed reluctance to disturb their combined judgment. Id.
at 345-46.
" ld. at 344.
38 hi. at 345.
3" Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Sapp. 501, 502 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
"See text at note 13 supra.
as
 The decision in Bishop can be read consistently with the Davis denial of due
process to injured reputation alone, if the Court intended that Bishop's employment
constituted a "tangible" interest under Davis. That the Court did so intend is suggested
by Davis' emphasis on employment as an example of a "tangible" interest, 424 U.S. at
701, and the Bishop Court's footnote refereike to Davis' "discussion of the interest in
reputation allied to employment . ..." 426 U.S. at 348 n.12 (emphasis added).
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suit was instituted. 42
 The Court observed that the reasons for dis-
charge were stated privately to Bishop and were also given in writing
in answer to interrogatories after this litigation commenced. Neither
of these communications constituted prior publication, however, and
the Court reasoned that to allow them as bases for a claim for due
process protection of reputation would penalize candor between em-
ployer and employee and between litigants. 43
This note will consider the narrowing of the constitutional rec-
ognition of the interests in reputation and employment presented by
the Davis and Bishop decisions. The focus of this analysis is the
threshold question presented by any due process claim, that is,
whether a protected interest exists whose infringment by the state re-
quires some degree of due process. 44 The interest in reputation is the
subject of the first section, which examines the requirement that in-
jury to reputation be accompanied by deprivation of some more tan-
gible interest, added by Davis, and Bishop's suggestion that the injury
to reputation must be actual rather than potential; that is, that publi-
cation of injurious statements must precede a claim for due process
protection of reputation. The interest in employment is considered in
the second section, which examines the two aspects of the property
claim in Bishop. First, Bishop's assertion that the ordinance governing
his employment engendered an enforceable expectation of continuity
is studied. Attention is then given to the second aspect of the property
claim, which concerns the understanding fostered by the circum-
stances surrounding Bishop's employment. The third section of this
note considers the attention awarded to the interests of the state by
the Bishop and Davis opinions, and compares that attention with the
balancing of state and individual interests in previous due process de-
cisions. Prior opinions suggest that consideration of these competing
interests is relevant to a determination not of the existence of a pro-
tected interest but of the degree of process required after a protected
interest, endangered by the state, has been identified. It is suggested
that the Bishop and Davis opinions have departed from recent decisons
in permitting consideration of the interests of the state to influence
the determination of whether a protected interest exists.
" 426 U.S. at 344.
"Id. at 345. Four Justices dissented. In an opinion written by Justice White, the
dissenters, Justices White, Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, interpreted the ordinance
governing discharge as conditioning discharge upon cause and thereby conferring a
property interest. Id. at 355. That opinion did not discuss Bishop's other claims. In
another opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, addressed Bishop's repu-
tation claim, concluding that the stigma imposed required a hearing in order for
Bishop to clear his name. Id. at 350-52. Justice Brennan also found that the ordinance
conferred a property interest and that even if it did not, the circumstances surrounding
Bishop's employment deserved examination for implied representations of continuity.
Id. at 353-54.
" Due process cases present a second question for analysis, namely, the degree of
process required in a given instance. See e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976). A discussion of Davis and Bishop in relation to this second question is beyond the
scope of this note.
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1. THE INTEREST IN REPUTATION
Government impairment of reputation has been the subject of
several Supreme Court cases. 45 Although not uniform in their treat-
ment, many of these decisions have appeared to extend constitutional
protection to reputation under the due process clause. 4" The interest
in reputation first drew substantial constitutional attention during the
loyalty trials of the 1940's and 1950's. 47 The severely stigmatizing ef-
fect of government imposition of the label of "subversive" or "Com-
munist" was noted in several cases. 48 One of the first of these was
United States v. Lovett, 4 t' where the Court struck down as an unconstitu-
tional bill of attainder an act of Congress which forbade payment of
compensation for government employment to named persons deemed
to be subversive. 5" Although the punishment which the legislature un-
constitutionally sought to inflict was identifed as exclusion from gov-
ernment employment, the Court also noted that serious injury to
reputation was involved."
Impairment of reputation arose in a due process context in Joint
" E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 4 19 U.S. 565 (1975); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S.
433 (1971); Jenkins v. McKeithcn, 395 U.S. 4 11 (1969); Wiematt v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951),
"E.g., Goss v. Lopez. 419 U.S. 565, 574-75 (1075); Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
400 U.S. 433, 437 (197!); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 424-25, 428-29 (1969).
The rules governing state and federal impairments 0r reputation under the fourteenth
and firth amendments are the same. See Davis, 424 U.S. at 702 n.3. This analysis treats
the due process clauses of both amendments as relevant.
Protection under the due process clause has generally been extended under the
heading of "liberty" rather than "property," see, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576
(1975), referring to "the liberty interest in reputation," although conceptually either
characterization might be appropriate. In denying protected status to the reputation in-
terest asserted in Davis, the Court took care to note that that interest was neither liberty
nor property, suggesting that reputation might, under other circumstances, constitute
either. See 424 U.S. at 712. Reputation would seem to deserve protection as a liberty in-
terest under the Court's broad definition of liberty as embracing "the right of the indi-
vidual to contract, to engage in any of' the corn Mimi occupations of life, to acquire use-
ful knowledge, to many, ... and bring up children, ... and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized ... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men," Meyer v. Nebraska, '262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), quoted in Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972), because an individual's good name is often crucial to the en-
joyment of these rights. On the other hand, reputation could be viewed as an intangible
property interest. -I-he Davis Court's conclusion that constitutional significance attaches
to reputation which has been legally guaranteed by the state ; 424 U.S. at 711, also sug-
gests a property interest. State conferrals of benefits have been found to create prop-
erty interests under the entitlement theory. See; e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972). For a discussion of the application of the entitlement theory to the in-
terest in reputation, see note 14 wpm.
"See, e.g., Wicman v. Upclegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
United States v, Lovett, 328 U.S. 30'3, 314 (1946).
" See note 47st/tire?.
" 328 U.S. 303 (1946),
"Id. at 316.
51 Id. at 314.
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Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath. 52 In that case several organi-
zations designated as Communist by the Attorney General sued to
have this designation rescinded. 53
 Five Justices, in separate opinions
and on varying grounds, reversed the lower court dismissals. 54 A
number of the Justices comprising the majority found that the stigma
imposed by this designation implicated the due process clause. 55 Sub-
sequently, in Wieman v. Updegraff, 56 the Court invalidated a state law
that excluded persons from public employment on disloyalty grounds.
The statute's constitutional infirmity was found in its arbitrary and
discriminatory determination that association with proscribed organi-
zations, whether innocent or knowing, was conclusive evidence of
disloyalty." In reaching this result, the Court emphasized the'severe
injury to reputation—a "badge of infamy"—resulting from denial of
employment for reasons of disloyalty. 58
Stigmatizing labels besides those of "Communist" and "subver-
sive" have been accorded due process attention in recent cases.
Wisconsin v. Constantineati," for example, addressed the official label-
ling of a person as an alcoholic. That case, decided in 1971, involved
a state statute which authorized designated persons to post notices
forbidding sales of liquor to any individual accused of habitual
intoxication. 80 The Court found the statute to be unconstitutional in
failing to provide due process to affected persons." In reaching this
result, the Court noted that the case involved the official branding of
52 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
55 Id. at 124-25.
J ustices  Frankfurter and Jackson reversed on due process grounds, id. at
172-74 & 186; Justice Black found an unconstitutional bill of attainder, id. at 143-44;
and Justices Burton and Douglas found that the Attorney General had exceeded his au-
thority and invaded the plaintiffs' "Common-law right to be free from defamation," id.
at 139. The Justices' reasons fur reversing the lower court dismissals are set forth at
note 100 infra.
"See text at notes 105-22 infra.
55 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
" Id. at 191.
59
 "There can be no dispute about the consequences visited upon a person ex-
cluded from public employment on disloyalty grounds. In the view of the community,
the stain is a deep one; indeed, it has become a badge of infamy.... Vet under the ...
[challenged] Act, the fact of association alone determines disloyalty and disqualification;
it matters not whether association existed innocently or knowingly." Id. at 190-91. Other
deleterious consequences of the Act were the inhibition of "democratic expression and
controversy at one of its chief sources" (the university), and the exclusion from gov-
ernment employment. Id.
Later due process cases similarly appeared to suggest that reputation merits con-
stitutional protection. For example, the Court in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers, Local
43 v. McElroy. 367 U.S. 886 (1961), in denying a due process claim, distinguished
Wieman as involving an impairment of reputation. Id. at 898-99. Cafeteria Workers was a
case of exclusion from employment at a Navy- ordnance installation on security
grounds. Due process was not mandated because no badge of disloyalty or infamy was
imposed: security clearance could be denied for non-pejorative reasons. Id.
59 400 U.S. 433 (1971),
"° Id. at 434-35 & n.2.
91 14. at 437, 439.
.52
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a person with a degrading label, and held that such state impairment
of one's "good name" demands due process." The Court did not
provide an elaborate rationale for this holding, but cited the Wieman
concern over state imposition of a "badge of infamy" and Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Anti-Fascist, which found due
process to be required in that case. 63
Although the statute struck down in Conslantineau touched both
the plaintiffs good name and her ability to purchase liquor, the criti-
cal injury appeared to be the damage to reputation. 64 This was the
reading given Constanlineau by several courts and commentators. 65
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, for instance, concluded
that "[Ole Supreme Court held [the Wisconsin] statute to be all un-
constitutional denial of 'liberty' since the persons whose names were
posted were exposed to public embarrassment and ridicule,"" Simi-
larly, one commentator observed that la]lthough the restriction on
drinking by itself might be cause for a right to a hearing, the decision
turned on the stigma resulting from the attendant publicity.""
The Supreme Court itself appeared to adopt this reading of
Constanlineau in the 1975 case of Goss v. Lopez." The Court in Goss
held that a temporary suspension of high school students requires
procedural safeguards by virtue of the resulting injury to reputation
as well as to a property interest in education benefits. 69 The Court
cited Constantinean for the proposition that government impairment of
an individual's good name demands due process." Noting that the
charges of misconduct could injure the students' standing with their
fellow pupils and their opportunities for future education and em-
ployment, the Court concluded that the state's unilateral action "im-
mediately collides with the requirements of the Constitution."11
Thus, the law prior to Paul v. Davis appeared to recognize repu-
tation as an interest sufficient by itself to merit constitutional
safeguards. The rule enunciated in Davis, that reputation attains con-
stitutional significance only in alliance with a more tangible interest,
thus constitutes a narrowing of due process protection of reputation.
62 hi. at 437.
43 ld.
"'See text. at notes 130-38 infra.
10 See, e.g., Ampleman v. Schlesinger, 534 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1976), which distin-
guished Constantinean as involving a stigma. In finding that an honorable discharge
from the Air Force did not implicate a liberty interest, the court observed that "(tihe
threshold determination to he made is whether or not a stigma is imposed. We are not
so persuaded." The court noted that there was no disclosure of reasons underlying the
honorable discharge, and that such information was confidential. let. at 828. See also,
Note, Kan. L. Rev. 202, 214 (1975).
"" Sims. v. Fox, 505 F.2d 857, 862 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011
(1975).
67 85 HMO,. L. REV. 861, 867 (1971).
" 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
"Id. at 574, 576.
"Id. at 574.
7 ' IS. at 575.
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A further diminution of the protection accorded reputation was
achieved by the Bishop requirement that to warrant due process, in-
jury to reputation must be actual rather than potential. This repre-
sents a narrowing of the Goss v. Lopez rule that the threat of future in-
jury to reputation inherent in the recording of damaging information
suffices to require due process." This section will examine these
changes in the law governing due process rights in reputation.
A. The Requirement of an Additional, "Tangible" Interest
The Supreme Court's decision in Paul v. Davis substantially nar-
rows the protection previously thought to be afforded reputation by
the due process clause. Under Davis, reputation alone does not consti-
tute liberty or property for purposes of the fourteenth amendment, 73
but may attain constitutional significance only in connection with
"some more tangible interest." 74 To reach this result, the Davis Court
reinterpreted Wisconsin v. Constantineaum in the light of several cases
which, for the most part, concerned concurrent impairments of repu-
tation and of some other interest. According to the Davis Court, these
cases are properly read to require the presence of another interest be-
fore the right to reputation can be constitutionally recognized."
Four cases preceding Constantineau were given rather lengthy
analysis in Davis." The Davis Court's reading of these precedents led
it to conclude that the Court has never recognized a due process right
in reputation unconnected with loss of government employment." Al-
though none of the four prior cases involved a denial of due process
protection to reputation alone, the Court in Davis asserted that those
cases did not grant such protection and so could not serve as prece-
dential support for a reading of Constantineau which accords constitu-
tional protection to reputation alone." The analysis which follows
questions these conclusions.
The Davis Court began its examination of precedent with United
States v. Lovett." The Court emphasized that the pivotal factor in find-
°2 1(1. See text al notes 161-62 infra.
79 424 U.S. at 701-10.
" Id. at 701. The Court also held that constitutional significance attaches to repu-
tation which has been legally guaranteed by the state. Id. at 711-12. See note 14 supra.
" See discussion on text at notes 128-35 infra.
76 "[T)he Court has never held that mere defamation of an individual, whether
by branding him disloyal or otherwise, was sufficient to invoke the guarantees of pro-
cedural due process absent an accompanying loss of government. employment." 424
U.S. at 706.
77 These were Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886 (1961); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
78
 424 U.S. at 706.
76 Id. at 706-08.
'10 328 U.S. 303 (1946). For a brief summary of the Lma'lt opinion, see text at
notes 49-51 supra.
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ing a bill of attainder in Lovett was the exclusion from government
employment." However, Lovett was not decided on due process
grounds, and perhaps for this reason was not discussed in
Conga nib; ea u . Lovett's holding that a legislative infliction of punish-
ment through exclusion from public employment constitutes a bill of
attainder appears to have little relevance to the question of due pro-
cess protection of reputation.
The Davis Court also turned attention to Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy," which held that exclusion without a
hearing from a navy ordnance installation for security reasons did not
offend due process. The Court in Cafeteria Workers noted that no
badge of infamy "with an attendant foreclosure from other employ-
ment opportunity" was imposed." The Davis, Court highlighted the
quoted phrase, apparently concluding that foreclosure of employment
opportunity is required before a badge of disloyalty takes on constitu-
tional significance." Yet foreclosure of opportunity is not equivalent
to the concurrent deprivation of employment which the Court in
Davis demands. Moreover, the phrase in Cafeteria Workers to which the
Court assigns such importance may simply constitute the earlier
Court's recognition that foreclosure of employment opportunity gen-
erally attends a serious impairment of reputation.
The Davis Court also analyzed the two cases that were cited by
the Constantineau Court to support its holding that due process is re-
quired where the state injures reputation;" namely, Wieman v.
Updegraff" and Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath." The
Davis Court read these cases as requiring loss of employment before a
due process right will attach to injured reputation. An analysis of the
two cases suggests, however, that they justify Constantineau's reliance
upon them in awarding constitutional protection to reputation alone.
Constantineau relied primarily on Wieman v. Updegraff, which was
cited in support of the proposition that "where the State attaches 'a
badge of infamy' to the citizen, due process comes into play." 88 The
Court in Wieman invalidated a statute which conditioned state em-
ployment upon the taking of' an oath disavowing membership in pro-
scribed organizations but which failed to distinguish between innocent
and knowing membership. 8" The Court in Davis emphasized that the
question of procedural due process was not reached in Wieman." This
9 ' 424 U.S. at 702.
92 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
" 3 /d. at 898-99.
" 4 424 U.S. at 705-06.
"Consiantinrau, 400 U.S.- at 437.
" 344 U.S. 183 (1951). For a brief' description of the Wientan opinion, see text at
notes 56.58 supra.
87 341 U.S. 123 (1951). For a brief description of the Anti-Fascist case, see text at
notes 52-55 supra. A fuller description is given in the text at notes 93-101 infra.
" Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 437, quoting Wieman, 344 U.S. at 191.
99 344 U.S. at 192.
"Davis, 424 U.S. at 705.
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was so because the statute was invalidated as arbitrary, thereby obviat-
ing the question of whether procedural due process was satisfied in
the form governing the statute's application to individual cases. The
Davis Court implied that because the Court in Wieman did not pass on
the procedural due process claim, Wieman provides no support for the
Constantineau insistence on due process protection of reputation. 9 ' Yet
it was the "badge of infamy" that triggered the Wieman Court's con-
cern over the statute's arbitrariness." As a result, it would seem that
the Court in Constantineau could justly infer that the Wieman Court
discerned constitutional overtones in the impairment of reputation.
The second case cited in Constantineau in support of the demand
for due process was Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath."
Constantineau's interest in Anti-Fascist focused on Justice Frankfurter's
recognition of "the right to be heard before being condemned to suf-
fer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the
stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction ... ..... The Davis Court
interpreted Anti-Fascist in general, and Justice Frankfurter's concur-
ring opinion in particular, to reach a result contrary to that reached
in Constantineau."
The plaintiffs in Anti-Fascist were organizations designated as
"Communist" by the Attorney General and included in his list of sub-
versive organizations which was transmitted to various federal agencies
for use in determining whether present or prospective employees
were disloyal." Plaintiffs sued to have this designation rescinded,
complaining of a loss of membership resulting from impairment of
reputation and from members' fears of exclusion from government
employment.97 In addition, plaintiffs' identification as Communists
touched off independent governmental actions which revoked their
tax-exempt status." The Court found that these injuries were suffi-
cient to allow suit for equitable relief and remanded for consideration
of the merits. 99 The concurring Justices reached their decisions to re-
verse the lower court dismissals on various grounds,"° but most of
"See id.
"2 Wientan, 344 U.S. at 191.
93 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
" Id. at 168 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), quoted in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
400 U.S. at 437.
"Davis, 424 U.S. at 703-05.
" 341 U.S. at 124-25,
97 Id. at 131, 135.
9" Id. at 158.
"Id. at 142.
I" For instance, Justice Burton, joined by Justice Douglas, found that the facts al-
leged in the complaints, which must be taken as admitted by the defendant Attorney
General by virtue of his motion to dismiss, indicated that the Attorney General had
acted arbitrarily and thereby exceeded the bounds of the authority conferred upon him
by the President. Id. at 129-125, 137. Stripped of this Presidential authorization, the At-
torney General's designation consituted an invasion of the plaintiffs' "common-law right
to be free from defamation." Id. at 139. Justice Black found an unconstitutional bill of
attainder, Id. at 143-44, as well as a violation of due process, id. at 143; Justice Frank-
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them included a discussion of due process, finding that due process
was required before the government could thus injure plaintiffs'
interests."'
As the Davis Court read Anti-Fascist, most of the Justices who
participated, whether concurring or dissenting, viewed stigma alone,
apart from revocation of tax exemption or loss of government em-
ployment, as insufficient to invoke due process."' The Davis Court
correctly attributed this view to the three dissenters in Anti-Fascist, and
to one of the five concurring Justices."`'' The opinion of Justice
Frankfurter (and those of Justices Black and Douglas as well 104 ) is,
however, susceptible to a very different interpretation.
In the Davis Court's analysis of Justice Frankfurter's opinion,
one remark was extracted from its context and cited as controlling.
Justice Frankfurter did observe, as noted in Davis, that "publicly des-
ignating an organization as within the proscribed categories of the
Loyalty Order does not directly deprive anyone of liberty or
property."'" Yet he proceeded to conclude that a hearing might
nonetheless be required in cases of indirect deprivations because an
examination of the course of prior decisionsm demonstrated that in
nearly all cases of government infliction of serious injury, due process
was found to be indispensable."' Procedural safeguards were denied
only in exceptional situations.'" Justice Frankfurter found that the in-
jury suffered in Anti-Fascist, although indirect, was so serious, that
even weighed against the admittedly vital security concerns of the
government,'" it served to "place upon the Attorney General the
burden of showing weighty reason for departing in this instance from
a rule so deeply imbedded in history and in the demands of
justice.""° Thus, the thrust of Justice Frankfurter's opinion is that
even in cases of serious indirect or consequential deprivations of lib-
furter emphasized a requirement of due process, id. at 172-74; as did Justice Jackson,
id. at 186; and Justice Douglas, in a separate opinion, found due process to be neces-
sary. Id. at 178.
m' See note 100 supra. The issue of due process was discussed in regard to both
the plaintiffs' standing to sue and the merits of their claim. See 341 U.S. at 152, 161
(Fran kfurter„1., concurring).
" 424 U.S. at 704-05, There was no majority opinion in Anti-Fascist.
"3 The three dissenters found that the Attorney General's designation did not
affect protected interests. 341 U.S. at 202. Only Justice Jackson based a demand for
due process on the potential exclusion from government employment facing members
of the organizations. Id. at 184.
"" See text at notes 117-22 infra. The remaining Justice, Justice Burton, did not
reach the issue of the due process.
ire Anti-Fascist, 341 U.S. at 164 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), quoird in Dar.ri., 424
U.S, at 703.
1 " 341 U.S. at 161-72.
1 "T Id. at 172,
lox Id .
1 " Id. at 164; id. at 174 (Douglas, J., concurring).
""Id. at 172.
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erty or property, the fundamental right to be heard must be re-
spected.
From Justice Frankfurter's observation that the designation did
not directly deprive anyone of either liberty or property, the Davis
Court inferred that the serious injury that demanded due process was
not the stigma imposed but the alteration of legal status involved in
denial of government employment and in the revocation of tax-
exempt classification.'" Yet Justice Frankfurter did not allude to the
plaintiffs' tax status in his discussion of the requirement of due pro-
cess. As to the possibility that members of the listed organizations
would be subject to loss of government employment, Justice Frankfur-
ter noted that the Loyalty Order did provide for a hearing in such
situations. 12 Without examining the sufficiency of that procedure, he
concluded that "the wholly summary process for the organizations is
inadequate.""a This suggests that Justice Frankfurter found that the
organizations themselves deserved due process for reasons other than
their members' potential exclusion from government employment or
the alteration of their tax status. Apparently, then, the decisive injury
in Justice Frankfurter's view was not the alteration of legal status sug-
gested by the Davis Court. Instead, Justice Frankfurter noted the dis-
couraging influence that government use of the designation might
have upon "[Notential members, contributors, or beneficiaries," con-
cluding that "in the conditions of our time such designation drastically
restricts the organizations, if it does not proscribe them."" 4
 This em-
phasis upon the effect that the label of Communist must produce in a
time of pervasive anti-Communist sentiment suggests that the injury
which required due process was an injury to reputation. Justice
Frankfurter's recognition of "the right to be heard before being con-
demned to suffer grievous loss of any leind," 15 which was cited in
Constantineau,'" is further indication that Justice Frankfurter did not
limit constitutionally cognizable injuries to the alteration of legal
status. It would seem, then, that the Constantineau Court validly in-
voked Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Anti-Fascist to support the due
process demand arising from impaired reputation.
Two other opinions in Anti-Fascist appeared to identify the
stigma imposed as requiring due process. Justice Black; whose opinion
was not discussed in Davis, gave his view in these words:
Assuming, though I deny, that the Constitution permits the
executive officially to determine, list and publicize individu-
als and groups as traitors and public enemies, I agree with
Mr. Justice Frankfurter that the Due Process Clause of
1 " 424 U.S. at 704-05.
112 341 U.S. at 173.
1 " Id. (emphasis added).
" 4 Id. at 161,
" Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
"2 See note 94 supra.
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the Fifth Amendment would bar such condemnation with-
out notice and a fear hearing.''
Justice Black thus connected the requirement of due process not with
a loss of employment, but with the imposition of a stigmatizing label,
and read Justice Frankfurter's opinion to do the same.
Justice Douglas also indicated that the injury to reputation en-
gendered a due process claim. The Davis Court read Justice Douglas'
opinion, as it read that. of Justice Frankfurter, to condition the due
process requirement upon a change in legal status. This result was
reached by focusing upon a portion of Justice Douglas' opinion in
which he identified the Attorney General's action as "a determination
of status" whose consequences "flow from actions of regulatory agen-
cies that are moving in the wake of the Attorney General's determina-
tion" as well as from public opinion."" Yet in Justice Douglas' view
the "status" determined by the Attorney General's action was simply
"whether the organization is or is not 'subversive.' """ This .
 "determi-
nation of status" is actually an identification or labelling, and differs
from the alteration of legal status through denials of tax exemption
and public employment emphasized by the Davis Court. That the
change in legal status cited in Davis was not determinative of the due
process right is further suggested by Justice Douglas' observation that
"[t]he gravity of the present charges is proof enough of the need for
notice and hearing before the United States officially brands these or-
ganizations as 'subversive.'""" In fact, he found that "[t]he system
used to condemn these organizations is bad enough. The evil is only
compounded when a government employee is charged with being
disloyal." 12 '
Further evidence that the stigma imposed was central to the de-
mand for due process is found in Justice Douglas' suggestion that the
derivative injury of loss of government employment to which mem-
bers of branded organizations were exposed was most grievous in its
effect on reputation. "If condemned, the public servant is branded for
life as a person unworthy of trust or confidence. To make that con-
demnation without meticulous regard for the decencies of a fair trial
is abhorrent to fundamental justice." 122 Thus, not only the opinion of
Justice Frankfurter but also those of Justices Black and Douglas lend
support to the conclusion that reputation alone commands due pro-
cess protection.
The Davis Courts' use of the Anti-Fascist case is troublesome in
another respect. As the Davis Court read the opinions in Anti-Fascist,
stigma alone "divorced from its effect on ... legal status such as
341 U.S. at 143.
" 8 /d. at 175, quoted in Donis, 424 US. at 703.
341 U.S. at 175.
nom. at 178.
' 2 ' Id. (emphasis added).
i n Id. at 180.
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loss of tax exemption or loss of government employment" was insuffi-
dent to demand due process.'" Yet in its summation of the line of
cases which included Anti-Fascist, the Court noted that it had never
held that injury to reputation invoked due process "absent an
accompanying loss of government employment. „I24 Besides shifting
focus from the broader alteration of legal status to the narrower loss
of employment, a shift which is corrected by the broad statement of
the rule as requiring "tangible” interests.' 23 the Court has revised its
own reading of Anti-Fascist to now require loss of employment as an
accompanying injury rather than as an effect of the imposition of a
stigma. Moreover, it is significant that loss of employment was but a
potential effect in Anti-Fascist. Thus, the Davis rule departs from
Anti-Fascist in apparently demanding a concurrent as opposed to a
potential loss of employment or other alteration of legal status. Since
potential damage to employment is almost inevitably effected by gov-
ernment defamation, the Anti
-Fascist decision provides some support
for a reading of Constantineau as granting due process protection to
reputation alone.
The Davis Court concluded its interpretation of the cases which
composed the "backdrop" 126 for Wisconsin v. Constantineau with the ob-
servation that the four cases did not involve the application of a due
process right to an impairment of reputation alone,'" and proceeded
to examine the Constantineau decision. Constantineau involved a state
statute which authorized town officials to post notices forbidding the
sale of liquor to any person accused of habitual intoxication. The
Court found that due process was required before such a "quasi-
judicial determination" could be made.' 26 As interpreted by Paul v.
Davis, the crucial factor was the combination of the injury to reputa-
tion with the deprivation of the right under law to purchase liquor.'"
To reach this result the Court looked to the following language in
Constantineau: "Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or in-
tegrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice
and an opportunity to be heard are essential." 130 The Davis Court
read the words "what the government is doing to him" as referring
not to the imposition of the label of alcoholic but to the deprivation of
the right to purchase liquor, concluding that both injuries were essen-
tial to the implication of the due process clause.' 31 The Davis Court
disregarded language in Constantineau recognizing the state's police
' 22
 424 U.S. at 705 (emphasis added).
124 Id. at 706 (emphasis added).
12  Id. at 701.
'"Id. at 707.
'" Id. at 706.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 436.
"9 Davis, 424 U.S. at 708-09.
139 400 U.S. at 437, quoted in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 708 (emphasis added in
Davis).
' 3 ' 424 U.S. at 708-09.
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power to respond to the problem of excessive drinking through re-
strictions on the sale of intoxicating liquors, and limiting the opinion
to the harm to reputation.
We have no doubt as to the power of a State to deal with
the evils described in the Act.... The only issue present
here is whether the label or characterization given a person
by "posting," though a mark of serious illness to some, is to
others such a stigma or badge of disgrace that procedural
due process requires notice and an opportunity to be
heard.' 22
The Court in Constantineau concluded that it did. 13
Besides omitting that language from its analysis of Constantineau,
the Davis Court dismissed as "ambiguous" 134
 the statement that "cer-
tainly where the State attaches 'a badge of infamy' to the citizen, due
process comes into play." 15 Justification for disregarding this "am-
biguous" language was based on the Court's interpretation of
Constantineau's predecessors. To give full effect to these words in
Constantineau would, in the Court's view, involve a significant broaden-
ing of the reconsidered cases.'" Yet those cases did not deny due
process to reputation alone. Instead, as has been suggested, they con-
tain much language favoring the now repudiated Constantineau posi-
tion that state infliction of a "badge of infamy" by itself mandates due
process.' 37
 The concern which the Supreme Court evidenced in those
prior cases over the damage inflicted by government stigmatization
suggests that a reacting of Constantineau which grants due process to
injured reputation by itself accords more closely not only with the ex-
plicit language of Constantineau but also with the prior course of deci-
sions, than does the construction devised by the Davis Court.'"
As further support for its narrow interpretation of the
Constantineau holding, the Court in Davis cited two cases subsequent to
Constantineau. in Board of Regents v. Roth,' 39
 in denying due process to
an untenured state university professor whose contract was not re-
newed, the Court observed that "[t]he State, in declining to rehire the
respondent, did not make any charge against him that might seriously
damage his standing and associations in his community." 14 " The Davis
Court interpreted the emphasized phrase as suggesting that a de-
famatory charge not made in the context of declining to rehire would
132
 400 U.S. at 436 (emphasis added). Justice Brennan noted this omission in his
dissent in Davis. 424 U.S. at 729-30.
133
 400 U.S. at 436.
131
 424 U.S. at 707.
135
 400 U.S. at 437.
136 424 U.S. at 708.
1 " See text at notes 80-125 supra.
13K Constantineau has been interpreted as according due process to reputation
alone by various federal courts and commentators. For examples, see notes 66.67 supra.
132
 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
"° Id. at 573, quoted in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 709 (emphasis added in Davis).
36)
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be insufficient to demand due process."' Yet there is nothing in Roth
to suggest that that prepositional phrase was inserted in order to limit
protection of reputation. Indeed, the quoted sentence can be read
with greater validity as an affirmation of the clue process right in
reputation. This reading gains support from the Roth Court's observa-
tion that the purpose of a hearing where a defamatory charge is made
"is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name. "142
The Davis Court derived further support for its reinterpretation
of Constanlineau from the 1975 case of Goss- v. Lopez.'" The Court
noted that while Goss recognized the seriousness of the injury to repu-
tation inflicted by suspension from high school, "it also took care to
point out" that a property interest in education, conferred by state
law, was infringed.'" This is accurate, but incomplete; due process
was required in Goss by state invasion of two protected interests—the
property interest in education and the liberty interest in reputation.' 45
The Goss Court's discussion of the liberty interest in reputation con-
tained no suggestion that recognition of that interest depended upon
the existence of another interest. Instead, the Court's treatment of the
two protected interests infringed by the school's actions suggested that
they were independent and of equal stature.'" Thus, both Roth and
141 424 U.S. at 700.
''12 408 U.S. at 573 n.12. This was also the reading given Roth by various lower
courts. One district court, for example, cited Roth in support of the proposition that
"[t]he concept of 'liberty' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment includes
charges against a person that might seriously damage his standing and associations in
his community." Hoberman v. Lock Haven Hospital, 377 F. Supp. 1178, 1185 (M.D. Pa.
1974). Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit read Roth to mean that
"[a] person is deprived of 'liberty' if the state damages his standing in the community by
charging him with an unsavory character trait ...." Hostrop v. Board of Junior College
District No. 515, 471 F.2d 488, 494 (7th Cir. 1972), cat. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973). See
also Lombard v. Board of Education, 502 F.2d 631, 637 (2d Cir. 1974), tem denied, 420
U.S. 976 (1975). (Untenured teacher discharged on ground of mental disorder entitled
to hearing by reason of stigma imposed.)
143 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
14
 424 U.S. at 710.
" 1
 419 U.S. at 576,
1" The Goss Court's holding regarding the liherty interest in reputation was ex-
plicit. The Court cited Constantineau and Roth for the proposition that government im-
pairment of an individual's good name demands due process. Id. at 574. Noting that
the charges of misconduct could injure the students' standing with their fellow pupils
and their opportunities for future education and employment, the Court concluded
that the state's unilateral action "immediately collides with the requirements of the Con-
stitution." Id. Justice Brennan read Goss as involving an independent liberty interest.
Davis, 424 U.S. at 730 n. 15 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See 24 KANSAS L. REV. 202,
212-13 (1975) where one commentator noted:
The Court's determination in Goss that plaintiffs claimed entitlement to
education was a protected property interest would in itself have consti-
tuted a sufficient basis on which to invoke the due process clause.
Nevertheless, the Court provided a second basis for its holding by deter-
mining that school suspensions implicate the liberty interest of the due
process clause [in their impact on reputation]....
[T]he Court based its conclusion [that a liberty interest was implicated]
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Goss can readily be construed to support a reading of Constantineau
which awards due process to reputation alone.
The Davis Court's conclusion, after examining these cases, was
that reputation has not been found' to deserve constitutional protec-
tion except where it is connected with a more tangible interest."' The
Court thus suggests a rule that awards constitutional significance to
reputation when an accompanying tangible interest is concurrently
impaired. The Court's reconsideration of precedent suggests that the
other interest need not, itself, be worthy of consititutional protection.
For instance, the Court's discussion of Roth identifies the mere re-
fusal to rehire an untenured professor as an example of a depriva-
don sufficient to render a concurrent impairment of reputation ac-
tionable on due process grounds.'" The reading given Comilantineau
indicates that the requirement of invasion of an additional tangible in-
terest is satisfied by the deprivation of one's "right" to purchase
liquor. 149 And in Bishop v. Wood,' 50 decided subsequent to Paul v.
Davis, the Court examined the merits of petitioner's reputation claim
even though it concluded that his accompanying employment claim
did not involve a constitutionally protected interest.'" Why an unpro-
tected interest in reputation should thus acquire constitutional signifi-
cance merely through association with another unprotected interest is
not explained. No precedent appears for this anomalous result of the
Court's strained effort to distinguish Paul v, Davis from its predeces-
sors. The effect is to deny due process in Davis without explicitly
overrruling prior decisions.
B. The Requironent That the Injury to Reputation Be Actual Rather Than
Potential
Bishop v. Wood, unlike Paul v. Davis, involved concurrent inter-
ferences with reputation and employment. The holding in Davis ad-
mits of a possible requirement of due process protection in such
situations." 2
 Protection was denied in Bishop, however, on the ground
that the defamatory charges of misconduct had not been made public.
except in answer to interrogatories after Bishop's claim was
instituted. 153
 The reasons for discharge were also communicated to
on the principle that nIticial action that injures or damages a person's
reputation thereby infringes upon the liberty interest, and such official ac-
tion must therefore meet the requirements of due process. The rationale
... is that [such act nay inhibit ... freedom to pursue later educa-
tional or employment opportunities ....
147
 424 U.S. at 701
145
 See the Court's discussion of Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972),
in Davis, 424 U.S. at 709-10.
I"
 See the court's discussion of Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971),
in Davis, 424 U.S. at 707-08.
15 " 426 U.S. 34 I (1976).
151
 Id. at 347-48.
"'See Davis, 424 U.S. at 701.
"3 Bishop, 426 U.S. al 348.
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Bishop in a private conversation. The Court concluded that "[Once
the ... [oral communication] of the reasons for dismissal was not
made public, it cannot properly form the basis for a claim that
petitioner's interest in his 'good name, reputation, honor, or integrity'
was thereby impaired," 154 and that the publication made in answer to
interrogatories subsequent to the institution of this suit could not pro-
vide retroactive support therefor.' 55
The Court declined to address the likelihood that recording of
these charges would lead to subsequent publication to prospective
employers, although Justice Brennan in dissent emphasized the
danger.'" Prior publication, of course, is required in common law
defamation actions.'" But there is no apparent reason why the
potential for subsequent publication inherent in the filing of defama-
tory information should not be sufficient to support a due process ac-
tion. Such potential publication was held to suffice in the 1975 case of
Goss v. Lopez. 158 There the Court held that the fourteenth amendment
is implicated when state action threatens injury to reputation and re-
sulting interference with advantages such as employment oppor-
tunities. 152 This threat was found to inhere in the simple recording of
charges of misconduct. In Goss, a temporary suspension of high school
students was deemed a deprivation of both the property interest in
education and the liberty interest in reputation sufficient to require
procedural safeguards.'" The impairment of reputation which there
required due process was potential rather than actual:
If sustained and recorded, those charges [of misconduct]
could seriously damage the students' standing with their fel-
low pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with later
opportunities for higher education and employment. It is
apparent that the claimed right of the State to determine
unilaterally and without process whether that misconduct
has occurred immediately collides with the requirements of
the Constitution.'"
The Court in Goss thus recognized the danger of subsequent injury to
reputation through publication to prospective employers.' 62 The
'" Id., quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971),
155 426 U.S. at 348.
156 Id. at 352 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
157 W. PROSSER. HANDBOOK or THE LAW or TORTS § 113, at 766 (4th ed. 1971),
riling McGuire v. Adkins, 284 Ala. 602, 603, 226 So. 2d 659, 661 (1969).
"" 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
"DI& at 574 (alternative holding).
mule/. at 574, 575.
"' Id. at 575 (footnote omitted).
162 Id. There was, in fact, limited immediate publication in both Goss and Bishop,
because the individual's fellows were necessarily aware, from his absence, that discipli-
nary measures were taken against him. Although other explanations for this absence
might have been devised, it would be reasonable to expect that rumors regarding mis-
conduct would flourish,
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Court demanded no proof that such publication would occur. It was
necessarily to he expected from the fact of recording and the propen-
sity of employers to inquire regarding conduct and disciplinary ac-
tions.
Lower courts have similarly concluded that impending damage
to reputation suffices to require due process. In Warren v. National As-
sociation of Secondary School Principals,'" for example, the court found
that plaintiffs expulsion from the National Honor Society compelled
due process, noting that "this black mark of a dismissal, which will
remain a part of the permanent school records, could very well have
adverse effects on his future ...." 1 " A like impairment of reputation,
resulting in a constriction of employment opportunities, looms in
plaintiff Bishop's future if, as we may assume, some record of the
reasons for dismissal was made in police department files. Yet no pro-
tection against this likelihood is provided under the Bishop rule requir-
ing prior publication.
Bishop's requirement of prior publication suggests a view of due
process as remedial. The Court declined to award due process as pro-
tection against future injury through publication; instead, procedural
safeguards were withheld because the communication had not yet
been made public. It appears that if the Police Department. had pub-
licly condemned Bishop in the course of terminating his employment,
due process would have been available. In such situation the purpose
of a hearing would be to remedy the harm already accomplished. By
contrast, prior cases suggest that the primary function of due process
is preventive. "For when a person has an opportunity to speak up in
his own defense, and when the State must listen to what he has to say,
substantively unfair and simply mistaken deprivations ... can be
prevented."'" This is the function that the Court ascribed to due
process in Fuentes v. Shevin.'" The Court further observed in that
case that "[i]f the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full pur-
pose ... it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the depriva-
tion can still be prevented." 187 Under Fuentes and other cases prior to
Bishop,'" the right to be heard accrues when loss is impending, rather
than after it is suffered.""
11" 375 F. Stipp. 1043 (N.D. Tex, 1974),
164 Id. at 1048. Cf. Sims v. Fox, 505 F.2d 857 (5th cir. 1974), reri. denied, 421 U.S.
1011 (1975), where the court found that the presence of adverse information in
confidential files does not infringe a liberty interest, observing that this case involved Air
Force regulations which prohibited disclosure of the information to anyone. Id. at 863.
'" Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
'" 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
167 ld. at 81
108 E.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972); Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1970).
"' Although prior cases contemplate that the required hearing may be post-
poned in extraordinary situations, .see, e.g., Board of Regents v, Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570
n.7 (1972), the Bishop Court has given no indication that this is such a situation. Nor
does any compelling state interest sufficient to justify an exception appear. The Bishop
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Prior cases thus appear to suggest that potential injury to reputa-
tion should suffice to require due process. In deciding otherwise,
the Bishop Court has further restricted the protection accorded
reputation.'"
C. The Impact of Davis and Bishop upon Due Process Protection of
Reputation
Under Paul v. Davis, injury to reputation does not create a valid
due process claim. Only when accompanied by deprivation of a more
"tangible" interest, such as government employment, or explicitly
guaranteed by state law does the harm to reputation attain constitu-
tional stature. Previous cases which seemed to recognize a due process
right in reputation alone are no longer to be read in support of that
proposition. As a result, attempts to vindicate reputation through de-
mands for due process, if not discouraged by Paul v. Davis, will now
depend upon demonstration of concurrent injury to a "tangible"
interest.' 7 ' Just what degree of "tangibility" will suffice is unclear. Be-
cause the Court's reconsideration of precedent suggests that a mere
refusal to rehire an untenured university professor,'" or depriva-
tion of one's "right" to purchase liquor,"a is adequate to cast a con-
situtional light upon reputation, it appears that the required addi-
opinion, in fact, makes no reference to a possible future hearing, as Bishop involves not
a postponement, but a denial of due process.
. 171' There is no indication that the Court in Bishop intended to correspondingly
alter the law regarding due process protection of interests other than reputation.
Another troubling aspect of the Court's response to Bishop's reputation claim in-
volves the treatment given the second communication of the reasons for
discharge—that made in response to interrogatories in the course of this litigation. The
Court found that this publication did not suffice to command due process because it
occurred "after petitioner nad suffered the injury for which he seeks redress" and so
could not "provide retroactive support for Bishop's claim." 426 U.S. at 348. If by "the
injury tier which he seeks redress" the Court was referring to the impairment of reputa-
tion, the Court's reasoning is unclear since that injury was not suffered until the publi-
cation ()mired. it may be, however, that the Court was referring to the deprivation of
employment. if so, it would appear that the Court found that a publication subsequent
to dismissal does not require due process. The possibility is thus presented that even as
the Court was denying clue process protection to reputation which has been placed in
jeopardy by the state, it was also kreclosing the opportunity for due process at a later
time, when this threat of impairment lias become real. This treatment of the publica-
tion made in response to interrogatories warns that the requisite connection between
impairment of reputation and damage to a more tangible interest might be lost if any
delay intervenes between the two. It thus appears that release of false and defamatory
information from the files of a former employer might not prove sufficient to compel
due process, even though that false information had been connected with a termination
of employment. If this was the Court's meaning, the Bishop decision has imposed a gloss
on the Davis requirement of any accompanying injury to a more tangible interest: the
deprivations must be exactly contemporaneous. Future cases should demonstrate
whether this was in fact the Court's intention.
"1 A state guarantee of continued enjoyment also suffices to raise reputation to a
protected level. 424 U.S. at 710-12.
'" See text and note at note 148 supra.
1 " See text and note at note 149 supra.
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Ilona] interest need not itself be protected as life, liberty, or property
under the due process clause.'"
By virtue of this limitation of the protection afforded reputation,
citizens like Davis may be labelled criminals by law enforcement or
other state officials, and be foreclosed from making a claim for due
process. On the other hand, one who, like Bishop, is accused of a
much lesser offense of misconduct or impropriety, provided that this
occurs in the course of a termination of employment, will have an op-
portunity to prove the merits of his claim. Nothing in the Court's
opinions explains or justifies this result.
One effect of the Davis rule restricting the liberty interest in
reputation may be, as justice Brennan worried in dissent,'" to induce
law enforcement officials to implement a policy of stigmatization to
circumvent the inefficiencies of the court system. This is unlikely
where state officials are subject to common law defamation actions.'"
The danger is increased, however, where officials are protected by a
privilege or immunity.'" Even a qualified privilege, such as can be
overcome by proof of malice on the part of the defamer,"s erects a
substantial bar to the branded individual's attempt to vindicate his
good name."'"
In cases where government impairment of reputation is accom-
panied by deprivation of a more "tangible" interest, such as employ-
ment, Bishop v. Wood adds the requirement that injury to reputation
be realized before a claim for due process is made, rejecting the Goss
approach, which granted protection against future injury inevitably
resulting from current state action. Thus, under the Bishop rule, no
right to be heard accrues at the time that defamatory information is
recorded, even though that information may later he made available
to inquirers who might use it to deny advantages such as employment
or education. To thus withhold the right to challenge derogatory
charges until those charges have been communicated to others is to
transform due process from a preventive to an ostensibly remedial
measure. As has been demonstrated, prior cases suggest that this is
not the function that due process was intended to serve.'s° This
174 See text at notes 147-51 supra.
15
 426 U.S. at 721 & '11,9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170 See Davis, 424 U,S. at 697: "llUespondent's unnplaint would appear to state a
classical claim for defatnaticill actionable in the courts of virtually every state."
177 See W. PROSSER. HANDBOOK (11"mi-I LAw Or TORTS § 114 (411t ed. 1971).
175 hi,	 § 115.
In The Davis Court's denial of constitutional status to reputation alone, 424 U.S.
at 701, except where recognized and protected by state law, id. at 710-11, suggests, in
addition, that the concept of "liberty" for due process purposes may henceforth be se-
verely limited and linked to interests that are in some way "guannueed" by the state.
The expansive definition of "liberty" of earlier cases, as embracing the right "generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized ... as essential to the orderly pursuit of hap-
piness by free men," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), yuuted in Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972), apparently: no longer obtains. See note 14
s upra.
"" See text at notes 165-69.
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change in function presents two difficulties: first, the affected person
may never learn that damaging information has been released; and
second, a hearing granted after publication can never fully undo the
harm.'" Thus the interest in reputation, already rendered insecure
by the Davis decision, is placed in an even more uncertain position as
a result of Bishop v. Wood.
II. THE INTEREST IN EMPLOYMENT
The Supreme Court has indicated that a constitutionally pro-
tected property interest may inhere in public employment. 182 In order
for a public employee to be entitled to due process prior to termina-
tion, however, his interest in employment must fall under the defini-
tion of "property interest" formulated in Board of Regents v. Roth: "To
have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more
than an abstract need or .... unilateral expectation .... He must, in-
stead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." 183 A legitimate
claim of entitlement to public employment may arise from a statute' 84
or ordinance'" governing eligibility therefor, from contract,'" or by
implication from the circumstances surrounding the employment.'"
Petitioner in Bishop v. Wood pressed a claim of entitlement to his posi-
tion as a police officer based on an expectation of continued employ-
ment deriving both from an ordinance governing discharge and from
the circumstances surrounding his employment.'" This section will
examine the Court's treatment of these two grounds for Bishop's
property claim.
A. The Claim To a Property Interest In Employment Conferred By the
Ordinance
The proposition that a statute may confer a property interest in
employment was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. In Arnett
v. Kennedy,'" six Justices agreed that where a statute conditions dis-
"' Nor is it clear that the Bishop Court would recognize a due process right aris-
ing upon subsequent publication. It may be that the requisite connection with a tangible
interest would he lust in the delay intervening between dismissal and publication. See
note 170 supra.
'" Perry v, Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972).
'" 408 U.S. at 577.
184 The Court in Board of Regents v. Roth indicated that a state statute may
create a legitimate claim to continued employment. In denying due process to an
untenured professor whose contract was not renewed, the Court noted that "InJor,
significantly, was there any state statute .. that secured his interest in re-employment or
that created any legitimate claim to it." Id. at 578 (emphasis added). See also Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (protected interest in welfare benefits secured by sta-
tute).
185
 Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 345.
"8 Perry v. Sit -Hien -mum, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
187 Id. at 602.
"8 426 U.S. at 344.
'" 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
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charge from employment upon cause, it creates a property right
which is protected by the clue process requirements of the
Constitution.'" The justices held also that these consititutional re-
quirements intervene regardless of the procedure governing discharge
specified within the statute. 16 ' Thus a statute may not grant a prop-
erty right and then detract from it through specifications of inade-
quately protective procedure. The analytic approach of Arnett v.
Kennedy thus indicates that a statute or regulation governing discharge
from public employment must be examined first to see whether it
confers a property interest. If it does, the second question is whether
the procedure specified therein comports with consititutional de-
mands. If so, the court should then determine whether there was
compliance with the procedural specifications.
The plaintiff in Bishop v. Wood asserted that a property interest
was conferred by a city ordinance which read, in part, as follows:
If a permanent employee fails to "perform work up to the
standard of the classification held, or continues to be neg-
ligent, inefficient, or unlit to perform his duties, he may be
dismissed by the City Manager. Any discharged employee
shall be given written notice of his discharge setting forth
the effective date and reasons for his discharge if he shall
request such a notice.' 12
The Supreme Court recognized that this language could be inter-
preted as conditioning discharge upon cause, thereby inducing an en-
forceable expectation of continued employment.'" The Court deter-
mined, however, that it could be otherwise construed as well.'"
"" Justices Powell and Blacktop, in an opinion written by Justice Powell,
reached this conclusion at 416 U.S. at 166. Justice White agreed at 181. Justice Mar-
shall, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan recorded his concurrence with this prin-
ciple in a dissenting opinion at 209-210.
A brief discussion of the result in Arnett is in order. In Arnett, a federal employee
asserted a protected interest in his employment and the constitutional inadequacy of the
statutory procedure for discharge. Id. at 138-139. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices
Burger ;Ind Stewart found that the interest in employment conferred by the statute was
conditioned by the accompanying procedural limitations, so that the constitution did
not intervene to require any process beyond that specified in the statute. Id. at 155. Jus-
tices Powell and Blackmun found that a property right was granted but. that the
adequacy of the statutory procedural safeguards must be measured by the Constitution.
Id. at 166-67. They found, however, that the procedure specified within the statute in
.4rnelt comported with constitutional due process requirements. Id. at 171. These five
Justices constituted a majority which reversed the judgment of a three ,judge district
court, Kennedy v. Sanchez, 349 F. Stipp. 863 (N.D. 111.  1972), that. the employee had
been unconstitutionally denied due process and that the statute in question was uncon-
stitutionally vague. Id. at 865, 866,
"' Justices Marshall, Douglas and Brennan reached this conclusion at 416 U.S. at
211. Justice White agreed at 185; ,Justices Powell and Blackmun did so at 167.
'° The ordinance was quoted in BiAop, 426 U.S. at 344 n.5, For the full text of
the ordinance, see note 23 supra,
"'' 426 U.S. at 345.
'54 Id .
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Choosing to defer to a "tenable" interpretation proffered by the dis-
trict court, the Court found that the ordinance merely specified pro-
cedure, and granted no property right. 1 " 5
 This deference to the lower
court's conclusion was based on the presumed greater expertise of the
federal judge who had for many years interpreted local law.'" The
Court also noted that the court of appeals, "albeit by an equally di-
vided Court," upheld the district court.'"
The interpretation which thus received the Court's approval had
been rendered by the district court prior to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Arnett. This may explain the fact that the district court never
asked the primary question posed by the Arnett test'" 8 —whether the
ordinance conditioned discharge upon cause, thereby conferring a
property right in employment. Instead, the district court addressed
Bishop's property interest claim primarily in relation to the surround-
ing circumstances and state law in general."" Consideration of the
ordinance focused mainly on the Police Department's compliance with
its procedural provisions.'" It may be that the court concluded that
because the ordinance did not require notice and a hearing, it con-
ferred no property right. Whatever its intention, the lower court's ap-
proach departed from that of Arnett, in failing to resolve the threshold
question of the existence of a protected interest by examining whether
discharge was conditioned upon cause. In adopting the district court's
reading of the ordinance, the Supreme Court proceeded as if the
lower court had addressed and rejected the claim that the ordinance
conditioned discharge upon cause and thereby created a property
interest.m Had the lower court so resolved that first question, no
error would inhere in its omission of the second issue—that of the
constitutional adequacy of the procedure specified within the ordi-
nance. Absent a protected property interest, the procedure for dis-
charge would not need to conform to due process requirements. In
that case, the lower court's findings in regard to the third
question—that the ordinance's procedural specifications received
compliance202
—would properly have concluded the inquiry. Due to
the majority's deference to the district court's reading of the ordi-
nance, the cardinal question of whether the ordinance conditioned
"5 Id. at 345-47.
"6 Id. at 345.
'"Id. at 345-46.
I" See text following note 191 supra.
"" See 377 F. Sum). 501, 502-04 (W.D. N.C. 1973).
'See id. at 503, 504.
2" See 426 U.S. at 345-47 & nn. 8, 9. The Court distinguished Bishop from Arnett
by noting that the lower court in Bishop held, on the basis of state law in general. that
Bishop "held his position at the will and pleasure of the city." Id. at 345 n.8. This does
nut adequately distinguish the two cases, since the lower court's finding left unresolved
the question of whether the ordinance conferred a property interest through condition-
ing discharge upon cause.
252 377 F. Stipp. 501, 503, (W.D. N.C. 1973).
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discharge upon cause, thereby conferring a protected property in-
terest, was never answered.'"
The dissenters in Bishop, however, have provided an answer to
this question. Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun, determined that "this ordinance plainly conditions
petitioner's dismissal on cause—i.e., 'failure to perform up to standard,
negligence, inefficiency, or unfitness to perform the job," 204 It is true,
as asserted by the majority, that the ordinance does not expressly ...
prohibit discharge for any other reason ...." 215
 In this regard the
ordinance in Bishop stands in contrast to the statute found to confer a
property interest in Arnett v. Kennedy. The latter provided that lain
individual in the competitive service may be removed or suspended
without pay only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the
service."'" The ordinance governing Bishop's employment lacks that
crucial "only." 207
 The dissenters in Bishop, in effect, have added it by
implication. Their implication is entirely reasonable, as it would be il-
logical For a legislative body to specify grounds for discharge if any
ground, or none at all, would suffice. The dissenters' interpretation is
buttressed by the ordinance's limitation to permanent employees. No
grounds are enunciated for discharge of probationary employees, who
apparently may be dismissed at will. The ordinance specifically pro-
vides, however, that permanent employees may be discharged for
cause. 2°8
 If permanent employees are also subject to dismissal without
cause, they are indistinguishable from probationary employees. It is
clear, however, that some distinction was intended. It would appear
that the construction adopted by the Court was accurately charac-
terized by Justice Brennan as a "strained reading."'"
Moreover, because the district court's construction of the ordi-
nance governing discharge was not informed by the Court's subse-
quent Arnett decision, it would appear that deference to that construc-
tion was inappropriate. Had the majority examined the ordinance de
novo and in light of Arnett, the interpretation given by the dissenters
may well have prevailed.
2 "3 In the court of appeals' initial consideration of Bishop, the brief per curiam
opinion affirmed the district court without reaching any express conclusion as to the
ordinance. 498 1 7 .2d 1341 (4th Cir. 1974). In dissent, however, lodge Winter explicitly
found that ''1 can only read this ordinance as giving plaintiff a right to continuing em-
ployment unless there be good cause for his dismissal." Id. at 1341. The court of ap-
peals decision was affirmed on rehearing en bane, without opinion, by an equally di-
vided court.. 426 U.S. at 343 n.3.
204 426 U.S. at 355 (White, j., dissenting).
2"5 Id. at 344.
2n" U.S.C. 7501(a) (1970) (emphasis added), quoted in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134, 140 (1974).
207
 The ordinance is quoted in the text at note 192 supra.
"" See note 23 supra.
2"° 426 U.S. at 353 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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B. The Claim that a Property Interest in Employment was Implied in the
Circumstances
The view that a property interest in employment can be implied
in the surrounding circumstances was adopted by the Supreme Court
in Perry v. Sindermann. 2 " There the Court concluded that "[a] teacher,
like the respondent, who has held his position for a number of years,
might be able to show from the circumstances of this service—and
from other relevant facts—that he has a legitimate claim of entitle-
ment to job tentire." 2 " The Court in Sindermann noted that there may
be an "unwritten 'common law' [in a particular job setting] ... that
certain employees shall have the equivalent of tenure."212 The
petitioner in Bishop v. Wood attempted to invoke this rule, claiming
that various circumstances of his employment had induced an en-
forceable understanding that he could not be discharged at will. 213
These circumstances included his classification as a "permanent," as
opposed to "probationary" employee, his period of service, and the
infrequency of discharge within the department. 214 The Court in
Bishop purported to uphold the Sindermann concept of implied rights
in employment, observing that "[a] property interest in employment
can, of course, be created by ordinance, or by an implied contract," 218
yet proceeded immediately to limit it: "[i]n either case, however, the
sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must be decided by reference
to state law."2 " The Court may have intended, by this statement,
either that a conferral of a property interest in employment may be
implied, but implied only in state law and not in the surrounding cir-
circumstances; or that iniplied property rights may arise from circum-
stances, but only if state law so ordains. In either case, the Court has
made the implied property interest in employment dependent upon
state law, in an apparent departure from Sindermann.
The Court derived support for this limitation of implied rights
in employment from a statement in Board of Regents v. Roth• 2 ' 7
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Con-
stitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law—rules or under-
standings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits. 218
This language does identify state law as a source of property interests,
2"
 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972).
311 Id .
212 Id .
. 213
 426 U.S. at 344.
214 Id.; id. at 354 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21 Id. at 344.
215 Id.
" 7 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
218 1d. at 577, quoted in Bishop, 426 U.S. at 344 n.7.
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but not the only source. 2 " By implying that a property interest in em-
ployment is entirely dependent upon state law, the Court has negated.
the "federal dimension to the definition of 'property' in the Federal
Constitution . ,"220 and has substantially narrowed the Sindermann
holding that due process is required before termination from public
employment where circumstances have engendered a property
right. 221 The Sindermann recognition of implied property rights deriv-
ing from circumstances accords with the purpose of the "institution of
property" which, as explained in Board of Regents v. Roth, is "to protect
those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that
must not be arbitrarily undermined." 222 The reliance that Roth found
to be constitutionally protected may, as suggested in Sindermann, be
produced by facts and circumstances rather than by state law. The
Roth and Sindermann opinions suggest that to decline to examine the
circumstances for a guarantee of continued employment may be to
undermine arbitrarily employees' legitimate reliance on tacit assur-
ances.
Because, in the Court's view, the sufficiency of Bishop's claim
had to be measured by the law of North Carolina, the Court pro-
ceeded to examine that. law to ascertain the degree of recognition ac-
corded public employment in that state. The Court read North
Carolina law as enunciated in the state supreme court's decision in
Still v. Lance, 223 as providing that an enforceable expectation of con-
tinued public employment ... can exist only if the employer, by stat-
ute or contract, has actually granted some form of guarantee." 224
Whether the Court meant to include implied contracts within the con-
cept of contracts by which the state may guarantee continued em-
ployment is unclear. The Court proceeded from this enunciation of
the applicable state law to conclude, without further explanation, that
the guarantee claimed by Bishop must be found, if at all, in the rele-
vant ordinance. 225 No consideration was given to a potential contract
guarantee. The disregard of a possible express contractual guarantee
can be explained by the absence of a written contract of employ-
ment. 22° It is more difficult to infer a reason for the Court's disregard
of an implied guarantee, unless according to the Court's reading of
state law such an implication was prohibited.
If this was the Court's understanding of North Carolina law, it
conflicts with the state supreme court case cited as the basis of this
understanding. That case, Still v. Lance,'" denied due process to a
2" See 426 U.S. at 353 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2211 Id.
2" 408 U.S. at 602-03.
222 408 U.S. at 577.
223 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2c1 403 (1971).
224
	 U.S. at 345, citing Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2c1 403 (1971).
225 426 U.S. at 345.
222 Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Supp. 501, 502 (W.D. N.C. 1973).
2" 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2c1 403 (1971).
573
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
teacher whose employment was terminated at the end of a school
year. 228 The state court recognized that a protected interest can derive
from circumstances: "Where ... there is a business usage, or other
circumstance, ... which shows that, at the time the parties contracted,
they intended the employment to continue through a fixed term, the
contract cannot be terminated at an earlier period except for cause or
by mutual consent." 2 "
The Court's intention in invoking Still v. Lance is not clear. If the
Court did in fact read that case as repudiating implied property in-
terests in employment, this would conflict immediately with the rec-
ognition of that right in Perry v. Sindermann, and with the language of
Still v. Lance itself. If, on the other hand, the enunciation in Bishop of
the Still holding includes implied understandings within the concept
of "contract ... actually granting] some form of guarantee," then
there is no explanation for the Court's silent refusal to examine the
circumstances. In either case, the Bishop decision indicates that prop-
erty interests may not readily be inferred from the circumstances sur-
rounding public employment.
C. The Impact of Bishop Upon Due Process Protection of Government
Employment
By deferring to the lower court's imerpetation of the ordinance
governing discharge, the Court in Bishop v. Wood has achieved a result
that departs from Arnett v. Kennedy, without disturbing the preceden-
tial import of that decision. The law regarding property claims based
upon statute is in no way altered by the Bishop decision. But the Court
has made clear its reluctance to interfere in "the multitude of person-
nel decisions that are made daily by public agencies." 23° Where such
interference cannot be avoided by the simple technique of deference
to another court's interpretation of the relevant statute as denying a
property interest, it may be expected that the Court will reach the
same result by distinguishing and narrowing precedent. Thus, we may
predict that the rule of Arnett v. Kennedy will suffer some erosion. This
might occur through emphasis of the procedural specifications within
a given statute governing discharge, to the detriment of language
suggestive of the conferral of a property interest.
Bishop v. Wood's cursory treatment of the claim that a property
interest in employment was implied in the surrounding circumstances
suggests a weakening of the recognition accorded implied rights in
employment by the Perry v. Sindermann decision. However, the Bishop
Court's resort to state law to ascertain the sufficiency of the property
claim based upon implication suggests that such claims might derive
228 /d. at 260, 265, 182 S.E.2d at 407, 410.
" 9 /d. at 259, 182 S.E.2d at 406-07
sou
	 U.S. at 349.
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saving grace from explicit. state recognition of implied rights in
employment."'
III. THE BALANCING OF COMPETING INTERESTS IN DUE PROCESS
DECISION MAKING
In Paul v. Davis and in Bishop v. Wood, the Court has demon-
strated concern for the interests of the state as law enforcer and
employer. 232 While the state's interest is relevant in due process deci-
sions to a determination of the degree of .procedure required,"" prior
decisions of the Court suggest that a balancing of the competing state
and individual interests is not pertinent to the initial question of
whether process is due at all. 234 This approach to due process deci-
sions indicates that where a legitimate property or liberty interest is
endangered by government action, a certain minimum procedure is
2" This expectation is weakened somewhat by the Court's failure to acknowledge
the apparent recognition accorded implied rights by the North Carolina Supreme
Court.
232 See Davis, 424 U.S. at 698-99; Bishop, 426 U.S at 349-50. Sr' text at notes
241-46 infilL
222 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 579-80 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91-93 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
224 The Court in Board of Regents v. Roth, for instance, 11;15 In Aed that while
" formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon
the importance of the interests involved' ... It]he constitutional requirement of oppor-
tunity for seen' form of hearing before deprivation of a protected interest, of course,
does not depend upon such a narrow balancing process." 408 U.S. at 570 n. 8 (em-
phasis in original), quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 37 t, 378 (1971). The Court
in Roth determined that "[w]hen protected interests are implicated, the right to some
kind of prior hearing is paramount." 408 U.S. at 569-70 11.7. The Court cited Boddie
v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371. 379 (1971), and Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S, 535. 542 (1971).
In Goss v. Lopez, the Court cited Roth for the proposition that "in determining
'whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the
'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake.'" 419 U.S. at 575-76, quoting Roth, 408
U.S. at 570-71 (emphasis in Roth),
Similarly, in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court stated that
"[Otis Court consistently has held that some form of a hearing is required before an
individual is finally deprived of a property interest." Id. at 333. Beyond the "fundamen-
tal requirement of , the opportunity to be heard,' id., the Court observed that "our
prior decisions indicated that identification of the specific dictates of due process gener-
ally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be
affected by the official actions; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation Of such in-
terest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if ally, of' additional or
Substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedural requirement would entail." N. at 334-35 (emphasis added). See also
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484-85, (1972), But see Hannah v. La•che, 363 U.S.
420, 442 (1960); and Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), which may be read to suggest that a determination
of the minimum of due process required by the Constitution is properly achieved
through a consideration of the competing interests.
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constitutionally imposed. 235 If the interest at stake is protected as life,
liberty, or property, then any deprivation thereof236 requires notice
and an opportunit• to be heard. 237 A process of weighing the compet-
ing state and individual interests enters into a determination of the
form of hearing—whether, for example, the right to present witnesses
or to be represented by counsel obtains in the particular situation. 239
Where the balance tips in favor of the state, due process may demand
merely an informal hearing in which the affected party is told the
reasons for the action taken and is allowed to present his side of the
story. 239
 Where the interest of the individual is greater, a more elabo-
rate hearing is required. 24 °
In both Paul v. Davis and Bishop v. Wood, the Court determined
that the alleged right invaded by the state was not constitutionally
protected. thereby obviating the weighing process. Yet it appears that
considerations of the interest of the state, considerations hitherto en-
gaged in as part of the weighing process, affected the decision to deny
the right to a hearing. if so, the function of examining the interest of
the state has shifted from its position in the balancing process which
determines how much procedure is due to the threshold position of
influencing the decision as to whether a protected interest exists
which demands any process at all.
Technically, the Court's decision regarding Bishop's employment
was reached by deference to the district court's interpretation of the
ordinance governing employment, which denied a property right.
The Court thus avoided the weighing process that determines the
form of procedure required before a property right may be infringed.
The Court, of course, was not bound to adopt the district court's in-
terpretation. The concerns possibly underlying the Court's deference
and the resulting denial of due process may well appear in the final
paragraph of the opinion:
The federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to
review the multitude of personnel decisions that are made
daily by public agencies. We must accept the harsh fact that
numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-to-
' Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578-79 (1975), riling Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950), and Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 & nn. 7, 8, 573 (1972); Wisconsin
v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
236
 As long as it is not "de minimus." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975).
232
 See cases cited in note 235 supra.
2 " See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579, 583 (1975); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 & n.8 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
239 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U,S. 565, 581 (1975). See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976).
24 ° In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1950), the analysis of competing interests
indicated that before welfare benefits may be terminated, the affected individual must
he provided an opportunity to appear and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Id. at 270.
He or she must also be allowed to be represented by counsel, although counsel need
not be provided. Id. at 270-71.
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day administration of our affairs.... The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee
against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions. 2 '"
This statement suggests the possibility that the Bishop Court's decision
to deny due process may have been reached through consideration of
the burden which procedural safeguards of notice and a hearing im-
pose upon state agencies. 242
This possibility is suggested again in the Bishop Court's treatment
of petitioner's reputation claim. The decision to deny this claim was
based upon the conclusion that no liberty interest was infringed, as
the reasons for discharge had not been made public before the suit
was brought. Yet in reaching this result, the Court evidenced concern
for the interests of the state as employer. The Court observed that al-
lowing a claim based on charges of misconduct "would penalize forth-
right and truthful communication between employer and employee
• . 243 Yet to allow a claim for due process in such circumstances
would "penalize" only the employer, as the employee who brings a
due process claim is not penalized in achieving his goal. The Court
may, however, have intended to express a concern that frank
employer-employee dialogue would be discouraged by the require-
ment of a hearing. Yet this concern also regards a matter of state
interest—the state's interest in healthy labor-management relations.
Also, in observing that any impact on petitioner's reputation would be
unaffected by the truth or falsity of the charges of misconduct be-
cause, in any event, they had not been made public, the Court de-
clared that "[a] contrary evaluation ... would enable every discharged
employee to assert a constitutional claim merely by alleging that his
former supervisor made a mistake. "244
The Court's appreciation of the state interest involved is appar-
ent, yet its position in the decisional process does not accord with that
recommended by recent decisions. Prior cases suggest that concern
for the interest of the state is not appropriate to an identification of
the status of the interest in question. 245 It is properly invoked as an
element in the balancing process employed to determine the degree
of procedure required once a protected interest has been identified.
In that context, the interest of the state is accommodated with that of
the individual, producing a result that is hopefully responsive to the
concerns of both parties. As employed in Bishop, however, considera-
tion of the state interest appears to have acquired increased impor-
tance not only because it may have influenced the threshold determi-
"' Bishop, 426 U.S. at 349-50 (footnote omitted),
"' The quoted statement may have been included as a refutation of Justice
Brennan's view in his dissent that property interests have a "federal dimension." 426
U.S. at 353 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 349.
S" Id. at 348-49.
2" See note 234 supra.
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nation of unprotected status but also because it was not balanced by
an assessment of the injury suffered through deprivation of employ-
ment.
The Court in Davis similarly avoided the balancing process by
determining that no protected interest was infringed and that there-
fore no process was due. This result was accomplished by devising a
new, more restrictive rule that rejects a constitutionally protected in-
terest in reputation alone. Yet in Davis, as in Bishop, the Court was re-
sponsive to the interests of the state and troubled by the burden that
a holding in favor of clue process would impose—in this case, on state
law enforcement activities. The entire first section of the opinion is
devoted to a consideration of the impediments that a decision in favor
of due process would pose to state activities. The Court observed, for
instance, that "[i]l' respondent's view is to prevail, a person arrested by
law enforcement officers who announce that they believe such person
to be responsible for a particular crime in order to calm the fears of
an aroused populace, presumably obtains a claim against such officers
under § 1983."246 Here, as in Bishop, the Court emphasizes the in-
terests of the state, despite the teachings of prior due process deci-
sions, to the effect that concerns regarding state interest and the bur-
dens that clue process imposes upon that interest should not deter-
mine whether due process requirements apply. 247 Rather, considera-
tions of this order are appropriately invoked only after a decision in
favor of clue process has been reached, in order to determine the
form of hearing required. And in its appropriate role, concern for the
interest of the state is balanced by an equivalent appreciation of the
threatened personal interest.
The result in Paul v. Davis and Bishop v. Wood is to give overrid-
ing importance to the state interest regardless of the severity of injury
suffered by the individual. 2" The Court could have avoided this re-
sult by reserving its consideration of the interest of the state until
after the constitutional status of the personal interest had been de-
termined. The analysis of the interests in reputation and employment
in the first two sections of this note indicates that a determination in
favor of constitutionally protected status would not represent a depar-
ture from recent due process decisions. Upon such resolution of the
threshold question in favor of constitutional protection, recent cases
advise that attention to the state interest is appropriate, provided this
attention is awarded in the context of a balancing of competing
concerns. 2 " This weighing process insures that a requirement of due
process will not automatically impose an intolerable burden upon the
:+s
	 U.S. at 698.
S" 7 See note 234 supra.
='" Justice Brennan, dissenting in Davis, complained that "Where is no attempt by
the Court to analyze the question as one of reconciliation of constitutionally protected
personal rights and the exigencies of law enforcement." 424 U.S. at 720 (Brennan. J.,
dissenting).
2" See note 234 supra.
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state. While notice and a hearing would be required as a constitutional
minimutn,"" the form of the hearing could be adjusted to reflect the
relative importance of the opposing interests.
For example, an evaluation of the law enforcement activity in
Davis might have indicated that it was subject to error and therefore
insufficiently effective to justify the severely stigmatizing charge of
criminal behavior and the widespread publication of that charge.
Thus a fairly wide range of safeguards"' might have been warranted.
Although this result might discourage the utilization of the particular
law enforcement procedure attacked in Davis, it could channel police
activity toward alternative procedures that evince greater respect for
individual rights and greater effectiveness. A sparer hearing might
have sufficed in Bishop, where considerations of the legitimate state in-
terest in the conduct of police officers and the burden of an elaborate
hearing would weigh more heavily.
Paul v. Davis and Bishop v. Wood may thus suggest a regrettable
alteration in the form governing clue process decision making. It ap-
pears that in these two cases the function of measuring the state in-
terest may have been shifted from its prior position as an aid in de-
termining how much process is due, to the threshold position of in-
fluencing whether process is due at all. At the same time, the interest
of the state has assumed exclusive importance, as the balancing of
competing concerns is avoided. This alteration works an unfortunate
result for the individual adversely affected by government action.
CONCLUSION
Paul v. Davis and Bishop v. Wood represent a narrowing of the
protection accorded to reputation and public employment tinder the
clue process clause. The rule of Paul v. Davis awards constitutional stat-
ure to injured reputation only when it is accompanied by deprivation
of another, more tangible interest, 25i 2 or is explicitly guaranteed by
state law. 253 This rule constitutes a departure from previous decisions,
which seemed to demand due process protection against government
impairment of reputation alone. 254 Under Bishop v. Wood, due process
claims which meet the Davis test may yet fail if the alleged impairment
of reputation is threatened rather than effected. 255 Reputation is no
longer protected against future injury inevitably resulting from cur-
rent state action.
Public employment, after Bishop v. Wood, no longer enjoys the
"" See cases cited in note 235 supra.
"' For example, representation by counsel, right to present witnesses on one's
behalf, opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses.
"2
 424 U.S. at 701.
"3
 hi, at 710-12.
2" E.g., Coss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-75 (1975); Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); Jenkins v. N1cKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 424-25, 428-29 (1969).
2"	426 U.S. at 348-49. See text at notes 152-65 supra.
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security afforded by the rules in Arnett v. Kennedy 256 and Perry v.
Sindermann. 257 Arnett v. Kennedy recognized a protected property in-
terest in public employment deriving from a statute which conditions
discharge upon cause. 25 " Bishop indicates that this result may he
avoided through deference to another court's interpretation of gov-
erning law, even should that interpretation disregard the teachings of
Arnett v. Kennedy. 25' Similarly, expectations of continued employment
fostered by circumstances, protected under Pend' v. Sindermann, now
provide an insecure basis for a due process claim, as the Bishop
decision suggests that property interests in state employment are de-
pendent upon state law,2 " which apparently may exclude interests
implied in the surrounding circumstances.
Paul v. Davis and Bishop v. Wood indicate that the words "liberty"
and "property" in the due process clause will no longer be read ex-
pansively, as protection of asserted rights is made increasingly depen-
dent upon state law. Moreover, in an apparent departure from recent
decisions, the Court in Davis and Bishop seems to have allowed con-
cern for the state interests implicated in these cases to influence the
threshold identification of the personal interest infringed by the
state."' In previous cases, consideration of the state interest was re-
served for the weighing process which determines the degree of pro-
cedure required once a constitutionally protected interest has been
identified. 262
 The Davis and Bishop opinions thus evidence increased
solicitude for the interests of the state to the corresponding detriment
of the personal interest at stake.
MAUREEN Fox
Securities Law—Exchange Liability Under Section 6(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934—Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler &
Co., Inc.' Plaintiff, Reuben P. Hughes, a businessman and private in-
vestor, brought suit against both Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., Inc.
(Dempsey) a broker-dealer and member of the New York Stock Ex-
change (Exchange), and the Exchange itself, to recover losses sus-
tained when certain securities subordinated by Hughes in favor of
Dempsey were sold for the benefit of creditors upon Dempsey's
liquidation.' Hughes alleged that members of Dempsey had fraudu-
2S8 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
2 " 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
23" See note 190 AUPYO.
23" See § I IA Supra.
28" See § 118 supra.
2" See §	 supra.
261 id.
534 F.2d 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 259 (1976).
2 1d. at 160. The claims against Dempsey were dismissed by the court. Id. at
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